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Considering a Negotiator's View
of the Court Process
JOHN S. MURRAY*
The traditional role model of the zealous advocate requires an effective
lawyer to prepare every case for trial. If a reasonable settlement offer
emerges before the trial concludes, the lawyer may advise his client to
accept it. If such an offer does not come, the lawyer continues to
litigate. The lawyer wastes little time and effort on negotiation because
the ultimate goal is court judgment. The courtroom provides the true
test for legal advocacy skills. The problem with this model is that
empirical data on lawyer activity does not support it. Trials or court
judgments on the merits occur in fewer than three out of ten cases
filed in court.'
Common experience suggests that what drives lawyers toward settle-
ment is their evaluation of probable success in court. The stronger the
case appears, the less interest the lawyer has in settling. Why compromise
when a client can win all at trial? A lawyer focuses on negotiating an
acceptable solution only if the court case appears weak. Why risk losing
everything at trial if something can be saved through negotiation?
In theory, a plaintiff should agree to a settlement if the net benefit
of accepting a specific offer equals or outweighs the estimated benefit
to be gained by staying with the court process. A defendant should
settle if the estimated burden of continuing to the end of litigation
outweighs the cost of accepting a specific demand now. Lawyers for
both sides should use their predictions of the likely court outcome as
the principal means of deciding whether to recommend settlement to
their respective clients.
The value of this court-centered perspective depends upon two as-
sumptions: first, that lawyers can determine objectively the probable
court outcome in most legal disputes, ind second, that most lawyers
make this determination with a reasonable degree of accuracy. Both
assumptions, however, are questionable. Lawyers recognize the uncer-
tainties and subjectivity inherent in predicting the court outcome in
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law, currently on leave, serving
as President and Director, The Conflict Clinic, Inc., Fairfax, Virginia, and Visiting
Professor, Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University. A.B.
1961, Cornell University; M.A. 1962, Columbia University; J.D. 1968, University of
Iowa.-Ed.
1. "Dunng 1985, civil cases closed without court action represented 48 percent of all
terminations Only 5 percent of all cases terminated (excluding land condemnation)
reached trial. The number of cases reaching trial has been steadily decreasing since 1982."
Annual Rept. of the Dir. of the Admin. Ofc. of the U.S. Courts, 1985, at 157. H. Ross,
SETTLED OUT OF COURT 3-5 (2d ed. 1980). "The principal institution of the law in action
is not trial; it is settlement out of court." Id. at 3.
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most disputes. They value experience and personal judgment as the basis
for evaluation, often eschewing rigorous analjsis. Moreover, few lawyers
test their experience for consistency and accuracy in prediction.
How should lawyers view the relationship between negotiation and
litigation? Are there inherent tensions between the two processes? Do
psychological factors help explain these tensions and suggest ways to
improve lawyer performance? Can lawyers use the court alternative to
complement negotiation?
This Article approaches these questions from both the psychological
and legal perspectives. The first section discusses three categories of
psychological factors that affect the way lawyers negotiate: self-decep-
tion, personality attributes, and social psychological variables. The second
section focuses on three ways lawyers can use the perceived court
outcome during the negotiation process: building a good lawyer-client
relationship, defining an effective bottom line, and maximizing bargaining
power for the client. A final section describes some insights suggested
by the earlier analysis.
2
I. PSYCHOLOGY, NEGOTIATION, AND THE COURT
"Who has deceived thee so oft as thyself."
- Poor Richard's Almanac
January 1738
The psychology of personal interaction is important to the practice
of law. An effective lawyer-client relationship is basic to the lawyer's
2. I refer throughout this Article to the court as the "alternative to negotiating a
settlement in a legal dispute." Exclusive reference to the court is a useful simplification.
First, legal education has taught lawyers for decades that the court process is the primary
means to negotiate settlements. My reference, therefore, corresponds to the assumption
of most lawyers in practice today. Second, most lawyers concentrate on client problems
for which the court is the prominent forum for resolution, problems in such areas as
personal injury, probate, divorce, criminal, civil rights, and commercial law. This Article
speaks directly to these situations. Third, the principles developed by the court-alternative
analysis can be easily adapted to cases with significant non-court alternatives and are
therefore relevant and useful regardless of the alternative available. Finally, I recognize
that not only are there other alternatives available in most cases, but that in many legal
disputes the court is not a viable alternative at all.
I am also using the court alternative as a BATNA - Best Alternative To a Negotiated
Agreement. R. FISHER & W URY, GETrING TO YES 104 (1981). See also nfra text
accompanying note 60. But see Kritzer, The Lawyer As Negotiator: Working in the
Shadows, 19 WORKING PAPER #4, SERIES 7, DISPUTE PROCESSING RESEARCH PROGRAM
(January 1986), in which the author suggests that "complement" is a more appropriate
term than "alternative" to refer to the relationship between negotiation and litigation. Id.
at 19.
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success. Many cases proceed to court not because the lawyer prefers it
but because the lawyer has been unable to persuade the client to accept
what the lawyer thinks is a reasonable settlement.3
The level of a lawyer's success may also depend on healthy interaction
with the opposing lawyer. In many ways the art of negotiating 4 -and
litigating'-is the art of interpersonal communication. Psychological
factors limit this communication and ultimately shape its internal structure.
This section analyzes the psychological forces at work as lawyers
evaluate and use a probable court outcome within the negotiation setting.
The three categories discussed are the characteristics of self-deception,
the role of personality attributes, and the impact of social psychological
variables.
A. Self-Deception
One of the most persistent and devastating problems in legal practice
is the power of self-deception. In general, people have a natural incli-
nation to notice those things that support their own perspective, opinion,
or attitude. 6 This universal bias is reinforced for lawyers by the advocacy
role that dominates American legal ethics. The legal advocate must be
a zealous guardian of the client's best interest, a role model that serves
to increase the lawyer's commitment to the client's perspective. Self-
deception can be a natural result of this professional commitment, and
its impact is especially unfortunate for the negotiating lawyer's view of
the court alternative.
A lawyer's self-deception begins as early in a case as an initial
investigation of fact or law. The lawyer may pursue a search more
vigorously if he or she expects the information gained will support the
client's claim. The zealous advocate role model requires the discovery
of everything possible to help the client succeed. Recent studies suggest
that people will determine the direction and extent of their search for
information based on their need to maintain a positive self image.7
3. See G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 59 (1982). In a study
among negotiating attorneys in Phoenix, Professor Williams found that "attorney-client
misunderstandings were the single largest factor in determining what cases went to trial
rather than settling." In cases that went to trial "over 50% of the attorneys said it was
due to the unwillingness of one or the other of the clients to accept a settlement figure
recommended by their own attorney." Id.
4. See G. NIERENBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF NEGOTIATING 4 (1973).
5. See Rothblatt, Psychological Techniques of Persuasion in the Trial Process, II
OHIO N.U.L. REv. 755 (1984).
6. D. GOLEMAN, VITAL LIES, SIMPLE TRUTHS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF-DECEPTION
197-202 (1985).
7. Pysczynski, Greenberg, & LaPrelle, Social Comparison after Success and Failure:
Biased Search for Information Consistent with a Self-Serving Conclusion, 21 J. EXPER-
IMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 195 (1985).
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Fulfilling this role model brings the lawyer strong professional satisfac-
tion, adding to his or her self-esteem.
A lawyer may also restrict inquiry on a case in order to preserve a
sense of internal compatibility with the professional role model.' The
lawyer for client A is not responsible for developing the facts or law
that support the claim of opposing party B. However, ignoring infor-
mation that supports the other side distorts any evaluation of the merits
of the case. (Vigorous searching for evidence to support the client's
case suggests less enthusiastic demands for information supporting the
opposing party's claim.)
The lawyer may not restrict the investigation consciously, but the
impact of self-deception is often felt through the unconscious mind.
Psychologists suggest that the human brain imposes an automatic, in-
telligent filter between the unconscious and the aware mind, so that in
the recognizing, sorting, and selecting process done by the unconscious,
most information is filtered out.9 The standard by which the unconscious
selects information to send to the aware mind appears to be the relevancy
of a particular thought to current mental processes.'0 Ideas that do not
support current inquiry or personal self-esteem tend to remain hidden.
As a result, lawyers on both sides will tend to overestimate the
probable court outcome in favor of their respective clients." This self-
serving exaggeration elevates each party's bottom line and increases the
chances for competitive negotiation behavior, stalemate, and an eventual
trial. The effective lawyer's task is to override these natural barriers to
objective inquiry and evaluation and to educate the client and opposing
counsel to a more objective probable court outcome.
Self-deception does have its positive role, although even here it is
not without danger. The mind often represses the recognition of fear,
anxiety, and other painful thoughts, screening them from awareness so
that a person can continue to think and act as if little risk or danger
were present.1 2 Negative pressure usually inhibits human achievement.
An ironworker or window-washer is trained not to think about the risk
of falling from the high perch. A lawyer responds more effectively in
the courtroom, the law library, or at the negotiating table if the lawyer
is neither fearful of losing the high stakes involved nor anxious about
personal embarrassment.
Moderate self-deception of this kind can build confidence and promote
steady performance of high quality The context, however, is crucial.
8. Id.
9. D. GOLEMAN, supra note 6, at 61-83.
10. Id. at 64-65.
11. H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 75 (1982); Bazerman,
Negotiator Judgment: A Critical Look at the Rationality Assumption, 27 Am. BEHAV-
IORAL SCIENTIST 220-22 (Nov. Dec. 1983).
12. D. GOLEMAN, supra note 6, at 241-43, 245.
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Selective ignorance of risks or unfavorable facts can be disastrous if
they matenally affect the ultimate outcome. A lawyer who enters a
case with a sense of superior competence vis-a-vis the other side 3 may
be in for a lesson in humility Moreover, confidence sometimes reduces
the motivation for discovering the other side's assets and liabilities, an
important element of good lawyenng. The dangers of self-deception
appear to outweigh its benefits for the negotiating lawyer.
B. Personality Attributes
Personality traits play a role in every negotiation. The more important
traits for our purposes are self-esteem, the drive to achieve, personal
leadership qualities, nsk-taking propensity, the need to control, aggres-
siveness, ethical flexibility, the level of mistrust of others, tolerance for
ambiguity, disorder and confrontation, and the need for close rapport
and support from colleagues.' 4 Each lawyer has a unique combination
of these traits which, when mixed with that of the opposing lawyer,
establishes a psychological environment that influences the negotiation
outcome.
Thus, every negotiation is different. An agreement by one pair of
negotiators may vary substantially from that of another pair.'5 Although
many separate factors can contribute to this wide variance, the balance
of personalities is usually a significant contributor. Moreover, the fewer
the negotiators and the more informal the interaction, the greater the
likely effect of individual personalities on the resulting outcome.
To negotiate well, a lawyer must understand his own psychological
strengths and weaknesses first, and then those of the opposing side. For
example, the lawyer may be a habitual gambler with a client's interests
in negotiation, but reluctant to jump into a courtroom on the same case.
This combination of risk-prone and risk-averse behavior, not uncommon
among lawyer-negotiators, may distort the case results unfavorably for
the client.
A useful way for a lawyer to proceed with a psychological self-
assessment is to consider how he negotiates with himself in making
professional decisions. For example, the lawyer should ask himself the
following questions: Does he or she call or write opposing counsel to
13. Bazerman, supra note 11, at 225; Lax & Sebemus, The Power of Alternatives or
the Limits to Negotiation, I NEGOTIATION J. 163, 170 (1985).
14. See Gilkey & Greenhalgh, The Role of Personality in Successful Negotiating, 2
NEGOTIATION J. 245, 245-46 (1986).
15. A simulated negotiation experiment conducted by Professor Williams among
experienced trial lawyers in Des Moines, Iowa, graphically demonstrated that conclusion.
Out of eleven sets of lawyers negotiating the same personal injury accident case, no two
results were the same, and the settlements ranged from $15,000 to $95,000. G. WILLIAMS,
supra note 3, at 6-7.
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communicate? Does this decision on the mode of communication vary
with the context of each case, or is it a consistent pattern systematically
applied? Do specific personality traits make one method more successful
than another9
The process by which a lawyer decides these questions to a large
extent depends on personality factors such as risk preference, need to
control, aggressiveness, ethical flexibility, and the need for collegial
rapport. Lawyers, like all humans, develop complex assumptions which
mask or distort realities that are either not understood or too painful
to admit consciously 16 This propensity to distort reality, a form of self-
deception, is based in part on certain personality and background factors,
such as self-esteem, a generalized level of mistrust, leadership qualities,
ethical flexibility, intelligence, and parental and educational influence.
A lack of sensitivity, knowledge, or interest in the subject matter of
the negotiation may also play a role.
People attribute motives to human behavior in one of two ways. An
act is the result of either the actor's stable personality traits or situational
factors beyond his or her control.' 7 When faced with actions of a disliked
opponent that are harmful to a client, the lawyer will tend to attribute
these acts to stable, negative personality characteristics of that opponent
and ignore or downplay the situational factors that might have molded
the conduct. However, if the lawyer's client or friend behaves poorly,
the lawyer will usually attribute those acts to situational factors com-
pelling such negative conduct, and the effect of personality is overlooked.
Lawyers should be sensitive to the interrelationship of personality and
situational factors. 18
A change in one personality variable within a negotiation may cause
significant variations in outcome. For example, within a competitive
negotiation an increase in the risk-averseness of one side operates to
the disadvantage of that side over time, 9 but may not be to the advantage
16. See D. GOLEMAN, supra note 6, at 61-83.
17. See Shaw, Political Terrorists: Dangers of Diagnosis and an Alternative to the
Psychopathology Model, 8 INT'L J. OF LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 359, 361 (1986). For
negotiating tactics to affect this attribution of motive, see D. PRUITT, NEGOTIATION
BEHAVIOR 146-47 (1981).
18. I am reminded of two jogging friends, one who runs indoors on a small enclosed
track and the other who prefers outside streets and sidewalks. The inside runner chooses
the comfort of a known and stable environment, rigidly structured, providing a supportive
and cozy atmosphere in which to exercise. The other chooses an open environment, subject
to the vagaries of the weather, with few structural restrictions. Despite these obvious
differences, their personality constructs are quite similar. The outdoor jogger establishes
a strict regimen much like his indoor friend, running a fixed pattern of streets and only
in good weather. Personal attitudes and traits may create similarities in different situations,
or distinctions in those that are alike.
19. Neilsen, Risk Sensitivity in Bargaining with More than Two Participants, 32 J.
ECON. THEORY 371 (1984).
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of all opponents in a greater than two-party negotiation.20
Moreover, the impact of personality types on each other will influence
the outcome. Competing lawyers with equally high levels of confidence,
patience, self-esteem, and risk-prone attitudes, coupled with comparable
ability, will often create an environment more conducive to negotiation
success. However, the clash of competing personality types - an ag-
gressive competitor against a trusting cooperative - will increase the
probability of either an unfair result or a stalemate. 21
C. Social Psychological Variables
Social psychological variables, such as role, gender, culture, and
structure, have an important impact on the way lawyers use the probable
court outcome in the negotiating context. Expectations that surround
these variables shape a lawyer's negotiating ability and influence the
possibilities for success.
Role. A lawyer's role is defined by the legal profession as combining
the functions of a zealous advocate22 and a thoughtful adviser 23 within
the framework of our adversary system of justice. 24 The adversary system
creates a set of expectations that define a professional negotiation. These
subjective expectations influence the outcome of negotiations because,
by being continually reinforced through lawyer behavior, they become
stable and self-sustaining within the negotiation setting.25 A lawyer's
reputation, built as it is on previous experiences, is a powerful tool in
shaping common expectations.26 Because of a universal human craving
for approval, most lawyers will try to conform to these expectations in
order to justify an attractive professional reputation. 27
Lawyers frequently link role expectations with "saving or losing face"
in a negotiation.28 The more experience lawyers have and the more
developed their reputations as negotiators have become, the more sen-
sitive they are to perceived loss of image.29 Experienced lawyers do not
20. Roth, A Note on Risk Aversion in a Perfect Equilibrium Model of Bargaining,
53 ECONOMETRICS 207 (1985).
21. See D. PRUITr, supra note 17, at ,81-87.
22. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-4 (1981).
23. Id. at EC 7-5.
24. Id. at EC 7-1, 7-19.
25. See Roth and Schoumaker, Expectations and Reputations in Bargaining: An
Experimental Study, 73 AM. ECON. REv. 362, 371 (June 1983).
26. Id. at 371.
27. See Assor and O'Quin, The Intangibles of Bargaining: Power and Competence
versus Deference and Approval, 116 J. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 119 (1982); Rubin, Nego-
tiation: An Introduction to Some Issues and Themes, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST
135, 138-39 (Nov. - Dec. 1983).
28. Rubin, Negotiation, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 135, 138 (Nov. - Dec. 1983).
29. Cf. Hilltrop & Rubin, Position Loss and Image Loss in Bargaining, 25 J. CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 521, 530 (1981).
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want to look weak or foolish before negotiating colleagues or clients.
This concern for appearing inadequate often causes a lawyer to become
rigid,3" to refuse to reevaluate the probable court outcome after dis-
covering new information, or to fail to consider settlement options that
are objectively in the interests of the client.
These considerations are especially applicable when negotiating law-
yers are from different status levels.31 High status lawyers will be more
willing to negotiate and compromise with low status opponents if the
opponents affirm the lawyers' effectiveness by positive feedback and
validation of their negotiating positions.3 2 A low status opponent who
rejects the lawyer's demand can mitigate the damage this rejection
causes by recognizing the lawyer's ability Any rejection of position will
normally be interpreted by a high status lawyer as an attack on the
lawyer's personal competence. 33
Lawyers are representatives of their clients. The level of accountability
may vary within the representative role, and this variability becomes
an important factor in a negotiation. If a client demands a high degree
of accountability, the lawyer will tend to be more competitive in face-
to-face negotiations with the other side. 34 Threats, positional commit-
ments, arguing to get the other side to concede, efforts to dominate,
and other pressure tactics are common if the client is demanding daily
briefings. 35 In contrast, the more trust and confidence that exists between
a client and lawyer, the less strict the accountability and the more
flexible the lawyer will be during the negotiation. The lawyer may show
that flexibility by a more problem-solving approach to the dispute.
Gender Stereotypes of male and female negotiators may be exag-
gerated and untrue, but many lawyers continue to accept them as
descriptions of reality The stereotypic man is competitive and distn-
butional in negotiating style, apparently due to youthful experiences in
athletics. The stereotypic woman is concerned for others, open about
her emotions, and sensitive to human relationships, apparently due again
to early socialization. 6
30. See D. PRUITT, supra note 17, at 29.
31. Lawyers involved in the same dispute may represent very different status levels.
Some examples: one may be from a large prestigious law firm, and the other, a sole
practitioner. One may be chief counsel in a large corporation or government agency; the
other, a new associate in a public interest law firm. One may defend murderers and
rapists; the other, shoplifters, and traffic speeders.
32. See Tjosvold & Huston, Social Face and Resistance to Compromise in Bargaining,
104 J. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 57 (1978).
33. Id. at 66.
34. See Carnevale, Pruitt & Seilheimer, Looking and Competing: Accountability and
Visual Access in Intergrative Bargaining, 40 J. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
111, 118 (1981).
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These stereotypes may seem inaccurate as applied on an individual
basis, but they persist. One reason may be the joint effects of role
expectations and self-deception.3 7 If lawyers believe that the stereotypes
exist, they will consciously notice information that supports the stereotype
and repress other data that refute it. Furthermore, a lawyer's responses
to interpersonal contact will tend to confirm the perceived expectations
of the other lawyer. For example, a female lawyer's response to a male
opponent will likely confirm behavioral stereotypes the male has, because
the female will try to match the expectations that the male expresses
through his words and behavior. 8
In empirical tests men and women behave similarly in most negotiation
settings. Nevertheless, women negotiators have been found to be less
comfortable generally with a competitive bargaining role.39 They speak
less, show more self-doubt, make fewer threats and derogatory comments,
use fewer positional commitments, are less willing to form coalitions in
greater than two-party negotiations, and exhibit more persuadable and
conforming behavior. 40 In other words, women use less standard com-
petitive tactics compared with men, perhaps because of a greater concern
for maintaining harmonious interpersonal relationships. On the other
hand, women consider themselves equally as competitive as men.41
Women's images of their own behavior conform to. the traditional
competitive role model. In the final analysis, the respective behavioral
patterns may be described in terms of bell-shaped curves, where the
curve for men is skewed slightly towards competitiveness and for women,
toward problem-solving. The areas of overlap, however, are substantial.
Combining the pressure of "saving face" with gender differences
produces an interesting result. Stalemates are more likely in mixed
gender negotiations where the female lawyer is representing a male-
dominated client (such as corporate management) and the male lawyer
is representing a female-dominated client (such as a union of female
workers).4 2 Expectation pressures on each lawyer flow from both the
client and the other negotiator. In the mixed-gender case, both lawyers
35. Id. at 118-19.
36. J. NIERENBERG & I. Ross, WOMEN AND THE ART OF NEGOTIATING, 102, 153-56
(1985); Skrypnek & Snyder, On the Self-Perpetuating Nature of Stereotypes About
Women and Men, 18 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 277 (1982).
37. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
38. Cf. Skrypnek and Snyder, supra note 36, at 278. See also supra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text.
39. Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband & Carnevale, Effects of Trust, As-
piration, and Gender on Negotiating Tactics, 38 J. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
9, 21-22 (1980).
40. Id. at 21-22.
41. Id. at 22.
42. See Wall, The Intergroup Bargaining of Mixed-Sex Groups, 62 J, APPLIED
PSYCHOLOGY 208 (April 1977).
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tend to exhibit competitive behavior in order not to lose "face" before
either their clients or the opposing lawyer."
Culture. People create subjective symbols or constructs with which
to interpret the complex reality of their world. These constructs are
what give each group an identity They provide members with a sense
of belonging. Each group's constructs are its culture.
Lawyers experience many cross-cultural contacts within an active law
practice. The most obvious is in the field of international trade and
diplomacy Negotiators from different nations may handle the same
negotiation problem in varying ways based on separate community
experiences and expectations. 44 For example, organizational decision-
making will be a slow consensus-building process for the Japanese; for
the Mexicans, a sensitive yet centralized process dependent on certain
key personalities who have leverage; for the French, a process that
emphasizes long-range objectives and principles over short-term gain;
and for Americans, an open, often impatient process, dependent on the
authority of certain positions, with short-term results-as the chief aim. 45
A second cross-cultural contact for lawyers is among different national
subgroups within the American legal community At any one time,
lawyers with ancestral ties to Ireland, Italy, Eastern Europe, China, and
Mexico may be negotiating with each other. The degree to which a
lawyer will reflect the role expectation of an ancestral home may depend
on how long the lawyer has been an American, how much the local
community reflects "the old country," and whether the client has the
same ethnic role expectations.
A third example is the constructs of a general practitioner from a
small, rural community compared with those of a corporate lawyer from
a large, urban center. The more personal, informal, and open qualities
of the small town, with its high value on non-material benefits, can
clash dramatically with the fast-paced, individualistic, materialistic life
of the large city Informal problem-solving in an atmosphere of mutual
trust may not mix well with high pressure competition where nothing
is left to trust.
A final example of cross-cultural contact lies in variations among
different professional disciplines,4 6 variations that can also be described
in terms of different role expectations. A banker, lawyer, realtor, pro-
fessor, accountant, and physician, though all Americans, may view the
43. Id. at 212.
44. See G. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERPSECTIVE
(1980).
45. Id. at 28-34.
46. Unterman, Negotiation and Cross-Cultural Communications, in INTERNATIONAL
NEGOTIATION: ART AND SCIENCE 69, 74 (Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs 1984).
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same problem from different perspectives. Their separate professional
language and education reflect these cultural differences. A lawyer most
often confronts this cross-cultural element in direct or cross-examination
during deposition and trial, but its importance can also be great during
negotiation.
A lawyer's primary objective is to be sensitive to the differing values,
beliefs, needs, and viewpoints that may be culturally based. "Successful
intercultural negotiators are aware that people indeed think, feel, and
behave differently and are at the same time, equally logical and rational. ' '47
Structure. Institutional pressures frequently influence a negotiation
outcome. The judicial system itself can be viewed as a structure with
its own set of expectations defined by the people and procedures operating
within. Lawyers will often govern their negotiation by certain time and
agenda schedules that the local court system has established. 4i
Other organizations can also influence negotiating behavior. Corpo-
rations, governmental agencies, and other client or employer organizations
develop their own accepted methods and limits for negotiation. 49 For
example, several federal agencies have established procedures for the
participation of regulated industries in negotiating new rules governing
their conduct.5 0
The lawyer's place within an organization can be important. A ne-
gotiator who is in a more central position with regard to information
is more influential than one on the periphery. Studies suggest that others
view the well-placed negotiator as being more competent and having
greater power."
Psychological variables influence lawyer behavior in negotiation and
litigation. Understanding these influences helps a lawyer develop some
workable insights for integrating the court alternative with the client's
goals. Before defining those insights, however, the function of the
probable court outcome in negotiation should be examined.
47. P CASSE & S. DEOL, MANAGING INTERCULTURAL NEGOTIATIONS at xvi (1985).
48. See supra notes 23-35 for a discussion of the impact of similar institutional
expectations under the role concept.
49. See generally, NEGOTIATING IN ORGANIZATIONS (M. Bazerman & R. Lewicke
ed. 1983).
50. See Agencies' Use of Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution, 1 C.F.R. §§ 305.85-
5, .86-3 (1986); Harter, Points on a Continuum: Dispute Resolution Procedures and the
Administrative Process, Report for Admin. Conf. of the U.S. (June 5, 1986). For an
example of application at the state level, see Vessels, Negotiated Rulemaking-A New
York State Success Story, 3 NEGOTIATION J. 53 (1987).
51. Stolte, Power Structure and Personal Competence, 106 J. SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
83, 87, 90 (1978).
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II. USING THE PROBABLE COURT OUTCOME DURING NEGOTIATION
"If a situation requires undivided attention, it will occur simul-
taneously with a compelling distraction."
-Hutchison's Law
Murphy's Law, Book Two
A lawyer has many uses for an accurate assessment of the probable
court outcome. First, the lawyer can use the process of evaluating the
court outcome to build a realistic and satisfying lawyer-client relationship.
Second, the probable court outcome can function as an effective bottom
line for evaluating any settlement offers made. Finally, the lawyer can
use a positive probable outcome as a power source within the negotiating
context. Concentration on the court alternative, however, has a significant
danger - it can consume the lawyer's time and commitment to the
extent that nothing remains for a successful negotiation. The three
positive uses of the probable court outcome are discussed as a means
of reducing the danger the court alternative presents.
A. Building the Lawyer-Client Relationship
Interpersonal relationships are central to practicing law effectively
Law schools and the legal profession have only recently emphasized the
study of, and training in, interpersonal communication. A number of
reasons may explain past neglect: the historical timing and rigidity of
substantive legal curriculum, the widespread belief that knowledge of
such skills is intuitive, and the lack of objective standards for evaluating
lawyer experiences in this area. Recent innovation in legal education is
changing this situation,5 2 but results of these efforts are as yet incomplete.
A most important contact for the lawyer is the client. On a personal
level, the lawyer-client relationship affects the degree of satisfaction the
lawyer receives from performing the legal role. On a professional level,
it can affect not only the process of resolving the client's problem, but
also the outcome the lawyer is able to achieve. To develop a good
relationship with the client should be a major goal for every lawyer.
A lawyer can improve the professional relationship with the client
by sharing the process of evaluating the probable outcome of the court
alternative. Joint effort toward a common goal generates a sense of
52. See Brown, Simulation Teaching: A Twenty-Second Semester Report, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 638 (1984); Macdonald, Curricular Development in the 1980s: A Perspective, 32
J. LEGAL EDUC. 569, 584-85 (1982); Sacks, Legal Education and the Changing Role of
Lawyers in Dispute Resolution, 34 J. LEGAL EDUc. 237, 241 (1984); Van Valkenburg,
Law Teachers, Law Students, and Litigation, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 584, 586 (1984).
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common purpose that builds a feeling of closeness. It also gives the
client a view of the lawyer's ability to handle the legal issues in the
case, breeding client confidence in the lawyer's competence and en-
couraging greater trust in the relationship. A compatible relationship
will help later when the lawyer may need to persuade the client either
to accept a responsible settlement offer or to recognize a less-than-ideal
court judgment as a realistic result.
The better the lawyer-client relationship, the more flexible the client
is likely to be during negotiation or litigation. An important variable
within the relationship is the degree to which the client will require a
lawyer to be accountable during the process. The more trust that
develops, the more the client will allow a lawyer to use the lawyer's
own judgment on the issues that arise during the course of a case.
Freedom from frequent, detailed accountings to the client may give a
lawyer the benefit of flexibility during negotiation and boost the lawyer's
own professional satisfaction.
The negotiating lawyer should be equally concerned that the opposing
lawyer have a healthy relationship with his or her client. If the other
side enjoys a lawyer-client relationship that breeds internal trust and
flexibility, the negotiation may avoid a competitive intransigence that
can often lead to stalemate and ultimately court.
Working with a lawyer on probable court outcomes also educates the
client on the uncertainties and risks inherent in the court alternative.
By sharing this process, a lawyer prepares the client for the task of
evaluating any settlement offers against a realistic standard. Unreason-
able client expectation can destroy gains made by effective negotiating.
Finally, the value of the perceived court outcome depends on the
accuracy of the facts upon which the analysis is based. The quality of
a lawyer's work product is based on the amount and quality of information
the client provides. The better the lawyer-client relationship, the greater
the information exchanged and the more likely it is to be accurate.53
Determining the probable court outcome in most cases is a difficult
task if done properly. Despite the skill required and the importance of
the result, little formal training is provided to lawyers to prepare them
for the job. However, practitioners and academics have recently devel-
oped useful checklists, computer programs, and decision-tree analysis
that assist in this effort.54 In addition, some firms specializing in eco-
53. Pruitt & Lewis, The Psychology of Integrative Bargaining, in NEGOTIATIONS 161,
175-76 (D. Druckman, ed. 1977).
54. See G. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 110-29; Nagel, Microcomputers, Risk Analysts
and Litigation Strategy, 19 AKRON L. REv. 35 (1985). Professor Nagel defines his terms
in an initial paragraph:
Litigation strategy mainly refers to deciding whether to go to trial or settle
out of court. Risk analysis mainly refers to procedures for making meaningful
decisions when one alternative provides a reasonably certain benefit or cost
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nomic, engineering, and medical analysis offer lawyers evaluation services
for most personal injury actions.55
Uncertainty is inherent in evaluating the probable court outcome.
Probable jury awards may vary depending on the demographic breakdown
of the jurors chosen, the urban or rural nature of the jurisdiction, the
predisposition of the judge, the type of injury or claim, the ability to
use demonstrable evidence at trial, and other factors.56 To compound
the problem, many states have recently legislated new liability rules
that will affect court awards during the next few years.5 7 This environ-
ment makes predicting court outcomes a speculative task at best.
Besides court and jury decisions, litigation costs are frequently difficult
to predict. The present value of an expected money judgment to be
received next year is an easy computation, but the method of quantifying
the cost to the client of time delay in reaching a solution is considerably
more difficult. How can a lawyer translate into financial terms the
client's emotional and psychological stress caused by an adversary dis-
covery period and trial? How does he or she predict the amount of
time prior to trial, whether a party will appeal the judgment, or how
much the final legal fee will be?
The risk of choosing the court alternative over a negotiated settlement
is another variable that is difficult to value in monetary terms. This
risk is primarily the client's, not the lawyer's, and depends to a large
degree on the client's personal payoff schedule. Professional ethics require
the lawyer to pass to the client the decision whether to accept or reject
a settlement offer.58 To put it differently, the client, not the lawyer, is
supposed to decide whether to accept or reject the risk of going to
court.59 Whether the client is more risk-prone or more risk-averse will
therefore affect the probability of choosing the court alternative.60
(like accepting a settlement), and another alternative provides a benefit or
cost that is contingent on the occurrence of a probabilistic event (like going
to trial). Id.
55. For recent examples, see the regular advertisements and classified ads at A.B.A.
J. 74, 97, 121 (August 1986).
56. See M. SHANLEY & M. PETERSON, COMPARATIVE JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS
IN SAN FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES, 1959-1980 (Institute for Civil Justice 1983),
in which the authors point to many common characteristics of the two urban county juries
over time, as well as their differences.
57. See Houser & Perlman, At Issue: Should Pain and Suffering Awards Have
Statutory Limits, 72 A.B.A. J. 34 (May 1986).
58. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-7, 7-8 (1981); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 1.2 (1983).
59. Many lawyers, however, try to infer client approval to go to court from the fact
that the client has hired the lawyers to help solve his or her problem.
60. The client's risk-taking attitude is not fixed. It can fluctuate depending on how
the issues are framed, the nature of the subject matter, or over time. See Bazerman,
supra note 12, at 211. The lawyer's interaction with the client in assessing the court
alternative may have a significant impact on the client's risk-preference level. See H.
RAIFFA, supra note 11, at 73-77.
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B. Defining the Bottom Line
A lawyer can use a probable court outcome as a bottom line or
reservation price during the negotiation.61 If a settlement proposal does
not offer net benefits equal to or in excess of the estimated value of
the probable court outcome, a plaintiffs lawyer should advise the client
to choose the court alternative. Similar reasoning applies to the de-
fendant, for whom the standard settlement provides lower costs rather
than greater benefits.
The more definite the lawyer can be in estimating the probable court
result, the more useful this prediction will be as a "bottom line" during
the negotiation process. Arriving at a firm figure, or a definitive range
of figures, may seem to be an elusive goal. Besides the inherent un-
certainties and risks already mentioned, any initial assessment will
probably change over time as the lawyer receives increased information,
the substantive law changes, or the client loses other opportunities. A
negotiating lawyer must respect this dynamic characteristic and change
the bottom line standard when appropriate. Rigorous preparation can
provide a clear and persuasive range of figures for the initial bottom
line, and regular mid-course corrections should keep the standard current.
Differences between respective valuations of the probable court out-
come often cause opposing lawyers and their clients to choose the court
over settlement. 62 Inadequate information encourages competitive and
threatening behavior within the negotiation setting,63 and competitive
behavior leads to more negotiating stalemates and greater resort to the
courts.6 4 Nothing can guarantee success at negotiation, but to the extent
lawyers can demonstrate the accuracy of their evaluation of the probable
court outcome, they will maximize the chances for favorable results.
Any realistic probable outcome range defines the zone of agreement
for a case, 65 and a responsible settlement should occur within this zone.
A legal negotiation should be a communication process aimed at dis-
covering and agreeing on the most reliable prediction of a court outcome
in the case, and then identifying settlement options that can improve
this outcome in the interests of both clients.
61. Professors Fisher and Ury refer to this concept as the BATNA. R. FISHER & W
URY, supra note 2, at 104.
62. H. Ross, supra note 1, at 163.
63. See D. HARNETT & L. CUMMINGS, BARGAINING BEHAVIOR: AN INTERNATIONAL
STUDY 164-65 (1980). See also Pruitt & Syna, Mismatching the Opponent's Offers in
Negotiation, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 103 (1985), for a discussion of
the effect of deadlines and ignorance of the other side's payoff schedule on the prevalence
of mismatching (high demand in response to low demand).
64. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 51.
65. For a detailed explanation of the zone of agreement, see H. RAIFFA, supra note
11, at 45-50.
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C. Maximizing Bargaining Power
The probable court outcome provides a limit on the range of acceptable
solutions through negotiation." For each party the negotiated agreement
should be at least equal to or more beneficial than its prediction of the
result at court. The better the probable court outcome is for one party,
the higher the bottom line and the more favorable the resulting agreement
must be before it will be accepted. To the degree that a desirable court
outcome is communicated accurately to and accepted by the other side,
the opposing lawyer will perceive a restricted zone of agreement, 67
increasing the pressure for settlement within this reduced zone. This
impact is an important element of bargaining power.
The probable court outcome is not a static value; it increases or
decreases over time depending on information and events. A lawyer can
improve the estimate by acting in a way consistent and supportive of
the court alternative. This close tie between the court alternative and
bargaining power explains the emphasis that many lawyers place on
litigation. They try to maximize the bargaining power of their clients
by concentrating on court action and using the probable court outcome
as an explicit threat within the negotiation context.68 Such behavior
focuses attention on the court schedule and encourages counter threats,
leading to a competitive atmosphere and greater likelihood of stalemate.
69
Trust -a good relationship - is diminished to the extent that lawyers
feel threatened by the other side.70
The danger of equating the threat of a positive court alternative with
power is that a lawyer will overlook the other elements that constitute
bargaining power.7 Using the court alternative as a prominent threat
reduces what power the lawyer could have generated from a compatible
relationship, beneficial options, legitimate norms, long-term contacts, and
a warm, personable nature. In order to maximize power, a lawyer should
use each element of power consistent with the other elements, appropriate
to the context of the case, and compatible with the lawyer's own personal
characteristics.
66. D. PRUITT, supra note 17, at 25, 87-88.
67. A zone of agreement exists in a negotiation if the bottom line of the plaintiff (in
a personal injury suit) is lower than the reservation price of the defendant.
68. For a thorough analysis of threats and their impact within the negotiation setting,
see T. MILBURN & K. WATMAN, ON THE NATURE OF THREAT: A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1981).
69. See D. PRUITT, supra note 17, at 77-78; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 48-51.
70. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 3, at 49-50.
71. There are five other elements of bargaining power in addition to a good alternative:
skill and knowledge of the negotiator, good relationships among interested parties, good
options, legitimacy, and commitment. Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using
Influence, 27 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST 149 (Nov. - Dec. 1983); see also C. KARASS,
THE NEGOTIATING GAME 156-63 (1974).
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A lawyer can increase existing bargaining power in a specific ne-
gotiation by improving the outcome reasonably expected from the court,
the probability that the outcome will occur, the other side's perception
of either of these figures, or any combination of these three. Some
lawyers suggest that the essence of negotiation is to mislead the opponent
as to your bottom line while not being misled yourself. 72 The risk in
that strategy is that the lawyer will focus exclusively on perceptions
rather than on improving either the probable court outcome itself or
its likelihood. The success of a perceptions strategy depends on the
ineffectiveness of the opposing lawyer, while actual improvement in
probable court outcome lies largely within the lawyer's own ability
The court alternative as a power source has five dimensions. The
first is based on the relationship between the probable court outcome
and the perceived zone of agreement. If court is the best alternative
to a negotiated agreement for both sides, the range of probable court
outcomes will be the zone of agreement. The balance of bargaining
power will favor the side that has evaluated the court alternative more
accurately and communicated it more credibly. The existence of positive
non-court alternatives reduces the power of the probable court outcome.
Second, the impact of the probable court outcome depends in part
on the perception the other side has of the acceptability to the lawyer
and client of choosing the court over a negotiated settlement. Bargaining
power is given away by one lawyer to the degree that the lawyer
perceives the court alternative as an acceptable or even preferable choice
for the other side. This dimension recognizes the risk-averse attitudes
of both clients and lawyers. This effect explains in part the traditional
importance given by lawyers to the act of "puffing" the probable result
at trial and continually threatening to "see you in court."
Third, the more easily a client can pursue the court alternative, the
more potent its impact on the other side's negotiation tactics. If litigation
is more expensive and time-consuming, the probable court outcome is
less effective as an element of power, no matter how favorable it is.
Fourth, the better the probable court outcome, the less interest a
lawyer and client may have in the work of negotiating a settlement. If
settlement is to be achieved, the other side may need to do more of
the work to bring it about. Moreover, to be personally respected by
opposing counsel is a powerful motivating force that may encourage a
lawyer in this situation to make added efforts to find agreement. 73
Finally, the balance of psychological factors such as confidence level,
willingness to take risks, and role expectations has an important impact
72. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotiation,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 926, 927-28.
73. See Rubin, supra note 28, at 138, 140-42.
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on the negotiation outcome. The relationship is normally inverse: as one
lawyer's confidence level or risk-prone attitude rises, the other's declines.
In sports, the act of trying to influence adversely the opponent's psy-
chological equilibrium is referred to as "psyching out" the competition.
In legal practice, it is considered zealous advocacy
III. INSIGHTS
"If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every
problem as a nail."
-Abraham Maslow
The court alternative dominates legal thinking. The court is the one
process in which lawyers hold a monopoly Law schools train their
students well in its use, and the legal profession supports its preeminence.
Lawyers therefore commit themselves and their clients early and often
to court procedures as the principal means of resolving disputes. Recent
studies, however, suggest that this commitment is at variance with
lawyer experience. At least seven out of ten court cases are resolved
by non-adjudicative means.74
An important question for the legal profession is how to conform a
lawyer's method of using the court alternative with the lawyer's expe-
rience in resolving disputes. The answer may lie in more attention to
the probable court outcome and its proper uses in negotiation and less
focus on court procedures and schedules as the principal dispute-resolving
process.
Traditional strategy calls for the lawyer to use the probable court
outcome as a threat to force the opposing side to concede. For maximum
credibility, this threat must be accompanied by a willingness if not
eagerness to go to trial, a confidence (if not egotistic self-assurance) in
courtroom ability, and a manipulation of court procedures to pressure
the opposition. To the lawyer using this traditional strategy, the court
remains the principal dispute-resolving process.
Traditional negotiating strategy overlooks the psychological forces at
work within the legal negotiation. A lawyer who makes the credible
threat to go to court assumes that (1) he or she has defined the probable
court outcome as objectively as possible, (2) opposing counsel has
evaluated the probable court outcome in the same way and with a
similar result, or the lawyer is willing to revise his or her result based
on what the opposing lawyer says, and (3) the other side would prefer
74. Trubek, Sarat, Felstmer, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation,
31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 72, 89 (1983).
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to settle than risk the anxiety, costs, and uncertainties of trial.
The earlier psychological discussion, however, destroys these as-
sumptions.75 Lawyers are likely to bias their separate evaluations of
probable court outcome in favor of their respective clients. The two
estimates exaggerate the gap that exists, making voluntary settlement
less attractive. In addition, the threat of going to court is a "controlled
threat" to most lawyers, more of an inducement to an attractive test
of competence than a threat of impending punishment.76 The present
system promotes settlement in the majority of cases largely because the
formalized court procedures require substantial time delays that dis-
courage full litigation. Traditional negotiation strategy is inefficient and
ineffective as judged by an understanding of the active psychological
forces.
To be effective, the lawyer must convey to opposing counsel the
existence of a good probable court outcome, a willingness to take the
case to trial if necessary, and a realistic confidence in his or her courtroom
ability. The same elements are present, but the environment and effect
created are different. The lawyer has signaled an interest in settlement
as a realistic goal, and the result should be an efficient resolution of
the dispute, whether ending in settlement or trial.
Self-deception, personality attributes, and social categories such as
role, gender, culture, and structure influence the way lawyers use the
probable court outcome during negotiation. Three insights may help
lawyers develop a more effective negotiating pattern.
Awareness. Self-deception cripples a lawyer who wants to be an
effective negotiator. To reduce the negative impact of self-deception, a
lawyer and client should play the roles of the opposing side in the
dispute as they prepare the case for negotiation. 77 The effects of this
role-play can improve realism and objectivity and "unfreeze" ideas that
may open common ground for a favorable settlement.78
Lawyers can experiment with other innovative ways to confront their
self-deceptions. They could pose a particularly difficult client problem
as a case study to an evaluation panel of lawyers in the law firm.7 9 If
the case is large enough to justify the expense, the lawyers could select
a neutral fact-finder who would review all relevant documents, listen to
75. See supra text accompanying notes 3-51.
76. T.'MILBURN & K. VATMAN, supra note 68, at 114.
77. D. GOLEMAN, supra note 6, at 237. Early references can be found in Greek and
Indian literature to the need for awareness or insight as a prescription for delusion. Id.
78. Bazerman, supra note 11, at 212-15.
79. Cal. B. Ass'n CLE tape, Negotiating Settlements in Personal Injury Cases, comments
of James Bostwick. Mr. Bostwick recommends that the lawyer at times reverse positions
in presenting the case study, so that the partners will not know who represents which
side and therefore will not be tempted to advocate the position of the firm's client.
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presentations by both sides, and provide an advisory opinion.s0 The mini-
trial"' and the summary jury trial12 are other methods for dissolving the
self-deception that distorts evaluation of the probable court outcome.
Awareness is best if built into the structure by which the lawyer prepares
for negotiation and trial.
Competing strategies. The balance of negotiation theories, strategies,
tactics, and styles 3 influences negotiation outcome. The two principal
theories recognized by researchers and practitioners are problem-solving
and competitive.84 If opposing lawyers use competing theories or strat-
egies, each lawyer may define or use the probable court outcome
differently A competitive lawyer will usually distort the probable out-
come more in favor of his or her client and will use it more as a threat
than a persuasive tool.
Competition between negotiating theories usually results in one lawyer
feeling less comfortable with the strategy or style eventually chosen,
like an athletic team playing at the opponent's home field. Good analysis
and use of the probable court outcome requires a significant level of
objectivity and sensitivity to the other side's information and perspective.
Being less comfortable in a negotiation creates more anxiety, increases
a lawyer's concentration on process over substance, and encourages
defensive tactics. The pressure to be continually on guard damages a
lawyer's use of the probable court outcome as both a bottom line and
an element of bargaining power.
When lawyers share the same strategy or style, whether problem-
solving or competitive, their attention can be focused on substance to
a much greater degree, increasing the chances for effective evaluation
and use of the probable court outcome.
Education. Psychologists have many things to teach lawyers. This
article describes some concepts and recent studies that are relevant to
legal negotiation. Much more can and should be discovered, discussed,
and learned. Fully integrating psychological concepts in regular sub-
stantive courses, or a separate course entitled Psychology and Law
Practice, should be a part of the core curriculum in every law school.
The knowledge can serve the lawyer well at trial, with the client, in
80. S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 283, 293-98 (1985).
81. See id. at 271-78.
82. See T. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of
Dispute Resolution, A Report to the Judicial Conf. of the U.S. Comm. on the Operations
of the Jury System (Jan. 1984).
83. Many practitioners and scholars use these terms interchangeably, although there
are significant distinctions among all four. See Murray, Understanding Competing Theories
of Negotiation, 2 NEGOTIATION J. 179 (1986).
84. Id. at 180-81.
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negotiation, and among the other members of the firm. Interpersonal
skills are comparable to the operation of law as leverage in getting a
client's dispute resolved fairly and efficiently. Lawyers currently rely
on intuition rather than study and practice for their knowledge of
interpersonal skills. Years of experience alone, however, cannot improve
lawyer abilities. Lawyers will benefit only by combining experience with
study and knowledge through law school classes and continuing legal
education seminars.
IV CONCLUSION
Most legal disputes are settled. Lawyers file lawsuits in less than
fifty percent of the total cases brought to them.8 5 They settle the rest
without any court assistance. Of those filed in court, lawyers resolve
over ninety percent without trial. Even some cases tried to final judgment
are settled by negotiation during appeal. Overall, lawyers and their
clients rely on specific court judgments in less than one percent of the
disputes.
Why then should lawyers concentrate on preparing most cases for
trial? The answer is, they should not. The lawyer's goal should be to
negotiate a favorable settlement for the client. A lawyer should con-
sciously use court procedures and deadlines during negotiation in ways
that will both increase the chances and acceptability of settlement and
improve the probable court outcome. The goal, to optimize the client's
return, can be attained from a negotiation process that is consistent
with maintaining a good probable court outcome. To achieve this goal,
the lawyer's attention must be focused on negotiation as the primary
process for resolving the client's disputes.
85. See Miller & Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary
Culture, 15 LAw & Soc'y REv. 525, 544 (1980-81).

